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Abstract 
In this paper we build a new model for understanding the relationship between wage and inflation. We 
introduce the concept of a cumulated wage gap – meaning the cumulated gap between the current wage 
and a maximum reference wage value in the past. The permanent income hypothesis is fundamentally flawed 
in times of crisis, because of uncertainty of future income. In a crisis, the reference is not expected income, 
but rather past income. Retirement savings and linear employment prospects are uncertain. People relate 
to their peak gains in the not so distant past rather than to uncertain future gains. The only certain reference 
value lies in the past, not in the future: and that is why current consumption is influenced by past income. 
The post-crisis Philips curve uses the cumulated wage gap instead of nominal wage. This is a measure of 
stock, not of flow. The post-crisis Philips curve is non-stationary, as it moves over time.  
We build a theoretical model and then we test it for all OECD countries, for a series of wage adjustments 
episodes (15 or more years ago, respectively the last global crisis). The model is empirically validated for all 
countries - including, to varying degrees, US, UK and euro-area, as the cumulated wage gap has a strong 
explanatory power on the deviation of inflation from its target. 
We find that inflation does not increase close to or above its target level until the cumulated wage gap is 
closed. In other words, for Philips curve to work, the loss of welfare from a negative cumulated wage gap 
must be fully compensated first – as a stock measure, not as a flow. 
The policy implication from here is that countries which closed their cumulated wage gap should be much 
more prudent in further wage increases – because they will be seen in inflation much faster and larger than 
in the recent past. For countries which have not closed their cumulated wage gap the implication is that 
inflation will remain subdued until they close their cumulated wage gap.  
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Explaining the post-crisis Philips curve: 
Cumulated wage gap matters for inflation 
Liviu Voinea 
CEPS Working Document No 2018/05, June 2018 
1. Introduction: Adjusting the Philips curve 
Inflation has been subdued in the post-crisis years, and the Philips curve has failed to explain it. 
It is probably the greatest mystery of the economic science in the last decade: where has the 
Philips curve gone? There are multiple references to the fact that the Philips curve has flattened 
over the last decade, if not earlier (Borio, 2017, Carney, 2017, Cunliffe, 2017, Praet, 2016 and 
2018 and Spencer, 2017). The flattened Philips curve and the lesser link between inflation and 
unemployment, inflation and output gaps, or inflation and wages, have multiple explanations. 
As presented in international literature, some of these explanations are: de-anchoring 
inflationary expectations, the labour market slack, a lower natural rate of unemployment, 
changes in expectations regarding the real pay growth, the decoupling between growth and 
inflation, the role of global value chains in keeping prices down, the role of migration in keeping 
wages down in the countries of destination, and others. While there is some truth in each and 
every of them, no alternative has been successfully suggested so far. 
The main point of this paper is that, if we want to explain inflation, we need to make some 
adjustments to the Philips curve.  
First, we work with observable variables only. The problem with econometric models which use 
non-observable variables is built-in: they tend to under-perform in bad times. These models 
need a reality check, and non-observable variables are not fit for that purpose. Potential GDP 
is revised retroactively. The output gap depends on potential GDP. Plus, an economy can grow 
above its potential without being at its full employment (this happens, but not exclusively, in 
catching-up economies).  
Any measure of unemployment is controversial, due to the impact of insufficiently accounted 
factors such as the underground economy, migration, inactivity, part-time employment. A non-
observable measure of unemployment, like NAIRU, is even more debatable. If Central Banks 
rest their decisions solely on such non-observable variables, they are at risk of getting it wrong. 
True, any non-observable variable becomes visible at some point in the form of a disequilibrium 
in other observable variables, among which the twin deficits (budget deficit and current 
account deficit). Yet, when it happens, it is usually too late for monetary policy.  
Therefore, we drop the non-observable variables such as output gap, inflationary expectations 
and NAIRU – at least when the task at stake is to explain inflation in a post-crisis environment. 
Instead, we choose to use observable variables only. Since wage is a measurable, reliable, 
2  LIVIU VOINEA 
 
accounted for, and comparable indicator, we focus on a Philips curve where consumer prices 
inflation rate is explained by the cumulative wage gap.  
As for the wage Philips curve, a number of recent studies also came to the conclusion that the 
wage Philips curve, relatively similar with the original one as developed by Phillips (1958), is 
more reliable when particular attention is devoted to creating a new reference measure for 
unemployment (Gali, 2011 and IMF, 2017), and even unemployment gap is theorised (Alichi, 
2015 and IMF, 2018). 
Second, we make a fundamental change of paradigm from flow to stock. To understand the 
consumption behaviour, which in turn influences inflation, we introduce the concept of a 
cumulated wage gap – meaning the cumulated gap between current wage and a peak reference 
wage value in the past. The permanent income hypothesis is fundamentally flawed in times of 
crisis, because of uncertainty of future income. The only certain reference value lies in the past, 
not in the future: and that is why current consumption is influenced by past income. We also 
introduce the concept of an inflation gap – meaning the deviation of present inflation from the 
target inflation or, in the absence of such, from its long-time average.  
Third, we allow for the Philips curve to be non-stationary: it moves over time, and it is absolutely 
normal to do so. Reference wage values, social preferences, jobs’ characteristics, skills’ 
endowments and even Central Banks’ targets, they all change over time – hence, the impact of 
cumulated wage gaps on inflation cannot be the same in different time periods.  
In this paper we build a new model for understanding the relationship between wage and 
inflation. In order to do so, we refer to cumulated wage gaps and inflation gaps, rather than 
wage and inflation as nominal variables. We find that inflation does not increase close to or 
above its target level until the cumulated wage gap is closed. In other words, for Philips curve to 
work, the loss of welfare from a negative cumulated wage gap must be fully compensated first – 
as a stock measure, not as a flow. The relationship between cumulated wage gap and inflation 
gap explains the unexplained: its explanatory power is statistically significant in countries which 
experienced a wage shock, and it is stronger after a crisis.  
2. Theoretical background 
Wages, as the most important source of income for most households around the globe, stand 
at the basis of any consumption theory. The main problem with the prevailing consumption 
theories (Keynes’ (1936) consumption function, Modigliani’s (1966) life-cycle hypothesis and 
Friedman’s (1957) permanent income hypothesis) is their long-term approach. This puts them 
at odds with our rather short and medium-term perspective on inflation, especially in times of 
crisis.  
Our approach is closer to Duesenberry (1952), who introduced relative income instead of the 
rate of change as the explanation of the differences in saving at the same level of income. He 
referred to the influence of past living standard on current consumption. Saving depends, he 
wrote, on the level of current income relative to higher incomes in previous years. However, 
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he stopped short of calling a wage gap or of considering the influence his consumption and 
saving theory may have on inflation.  
What matters most for consumption during and after a crisis is not the unit change of income, 
the savings for retirement, or the future income. A recession is a game-changer. In a recession, 
the transitory component of income becomes negative not only for one person or for a small 
group, but for the national or global economy. This makes it very difficult to predict future 
income. When nothing is steady anymore, the only valid reference remains the past income. 
In a crisis, the reference is not ahead of us, but rather is in the past. Retirement savings and 
linear employment prospects are uncertain. People relate to their peak gains in the not so 
distant past rather than to uncertain future gains. 
Consumption does not depend only on current income and future expectations, but also on past 
income. 
Stock is more relevant than flow, because people have a strong reference which is their previous 
income levels. People do not spend as much as before when their wage drops, and they spend 
more if they have higher wages. While this is intuitive and apparently well theorized, everything 
is related to wage flows and to wage dynamics. We hold that we should account the stock as 
well, meaning the cumulated gap between current levels and past reference levels of income. 
Cumulated wage gap is a better predictor of inflation than output gap because it is observable 
(can be calculated) and it refers to past consumption and price levels; while output gap is non-
observable and it makes conservative assumptions for the future.  
Past wages are the minimum potential wages for the wage earners. Hence, people will judge 
their consumption decisions based on the relation between their current wages and their past 
wages, adjusted for inflation. I call this difference real wage gap.  
The cumulated real wage gap, instead of nominal wage, is the explanatory variable in our new 
Philips curve. The dependent variable is the inflation gap, which refers to the gap between 
inflation and the inflation target (or, in the absence of a target, an average value of inflation 
over a longer time-span).  
Inflation gap is a more relevant variable for policy makers than the inflation rate because it puts 
inflation in relation to a desired level. A negative inflation gap means more demand-side 
measures are needed. A positive inflation gap means that the risk of overshooting is already 
present and policy tightening is required.  
For inflation, the reference point is not in the past – but it is rather a normative value, 
commonly agreed to be desirable for a given society at a given point in time.  
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3. The wage gap model 
3.1 Wage gap 
This study uses cumulated real wage gap instead of wages or unemployment rate in the Phillips 
curve. We start by defining the wage gap: 
𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇𝑛 = 𝑊𝑇𝑛 − 𝑊𝑇0  (1) 
where 𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇𝑛 is the real wage gap at time Tn, 𝑊𝑇𝑛  is the real wage at time Tn, and 𝑊𝑇0 is the 
real wage at time T0, the maximum real wage value in the reference period. 
The cumulated real wage gap at time Tn is defined as: 
𝒄𝑾𝒈𝒂𝒑 𝑻𝑵 = ∑ 𝑾𝒈𝒂𝒑 𝑻𝒏
𝑵
𝒏=𝟏 = ∑ (𝑾𝑻𝒏 − 𝑾𝑻𝟎)
𝑵
𝒏=𝟏     (2) 
A theoretical graphical representation of the real wage and the cumulated real wage gap for a 
6-period model can be observed in the chart below. 
At time T1, when real wage W1 drops relative to the reference real wage W0, the cumulated 
real wage gap is the area A. At time T2, when real wage drops even further, the cumulated real 
wage gap is the sum of areas A and B. At time T3, the real wage starts to increase, but as it 
remains below the reference value, the cumulated real wage gap further deepens (A+B+C). At 
time T4, when the real wage increases above the reference maximum value, the cumulated real 
wage gap starts to shrink (A+B+C+D). The growth of real wage makes the cumulated real wage 
gap to close at time T5 (A+B+C+D+E) and to enter into the positive territory at time T6 
(A+B+C+D+E+F). 
The cumulated real wage gap for the above 6-period model is described below: 
𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇1 = 𝐴 = ∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇1
𝑇0
< 0  (3) 
𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇2 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 = ∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇1
𝑇0
+ ∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇2
𝑇1
= ∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇2
𝑇0
< 0 (4) 
𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇3 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶 = ∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇1
𝑇0
+ ∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 +
𝑇2
𝑇1
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇3
𝑇2
=
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇3
𝑇0
< 0 (5) 
𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇4 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶 + 𝐷 = ∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇1
𝑇0
+
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 +
𝑇2
𝑇1
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 +
𝑇3
𝑇2
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇4
𝑇3
= ∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇4
𝑇0
< 0 and 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇4 >
𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇3 (6) 
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𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇5 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶 + 𝐷 + 𝐸 = ∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇1
𝑇0
+
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 +
𝑇2
𝑇1
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 +
𝑇3
𝑇2
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 +
𝑇4
𝑇3
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇5
𝑇4
= ∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇5
𝑇0
=
0  (7) 
𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇6 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶 + 𝐷 + 𝐸 + 𝐹 = ∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇1
𝑇0
+
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 +
𝑇2
𝑇1
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 +
𝑇3
𝑇2
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 +
𝑇4
𝑇3
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇5
𝑇4
+ ∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇6
𝑇5
=
∫ 𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇6
𝑇0
> 0    (8) 
where A is the cumulated real wage gap between T1 and T0, B is the cumulated real wage gap 
between T2 and T1, C is the cumulated real wage gap between T3 and T2, D is the cumulated 
real wage gap between T4 and T3, E is the cumulated real wage gap between T5 and T4 and F is 
the cumulated real wage gap between T6 and T5, all being expressed as areas.  
Chart 1. Real wage and the cumulated real wage gap 
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Source: Author. 
In general, the formula for the cumulated real wage gap at time TN is as follows: 
𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇𝑁 = ∑ (𝑊𝑇𝑛 − 𝑊𝑇0)
𝑁
𝑛=1 = ∑ 𝐴𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1  (9) 
where 𝑇𝑁 is the time period and 𝐴𝑛 is the gap between 𝑊𝑛 and 𝑊𝑛−1, expressed as area. 
If a new recession comes at T7 (not shown in the above charts), the new reference value for the 
real wage is at T6. 
3.2 Inflation gap 
The inflation gap is defined as the deviation from the central banks’ target: 
𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇𝑛 = 𝛱𝑇𝑛 − 𝛱𝑇𝑛
∗    (10) 
where 𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇𝑛 is the inflation gap at time Tn, 𝛱𝑇𝑛  is the inflation rate at time Tn, and 𝛱𝑇𝑛
∗  is the 
central banks’ target at time Tn, or, in the absence of that, an average of long-time inflation. 
A theoretical graphical representation of the inflation gap for a 6-period model can be observed 
in the next chart. 
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Chart 2. Inflation rate and inflation gap 
 
Source: Author. 
The inflation gap for the above 6-period model fulfils the following relations: 
𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇0 = 𝛱𝑇0 − 𝛱𝑇0
∗ > 0 (11) 
𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇1 = 𝛱𝑇1 − 𝛱𝑇1
∗ < 0 (12) 
𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇2 = 𝛱𝑇2 − 𝛱𝑇2
∗ < 0 (13) 
𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇3 = 𝛱𝑇3 − 𝛱𝑇3
∗ < 0 and 𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇3 < 𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇2 (14) 
𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇4 = 𝛱𝑇4 − 𝛱𝑇4
∗ < 0 and 𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇4 > 𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇3 (15) 
𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇5 = 𝛱𝑇5 − 𝛱𝑇5
∗ = 0 (16) 
At time T0, at the maximum reference value for wages, we assume that inflation rate is above 
the central bank’s inflation target, given the inflationary pressures caused by high wages. 
Therefore, inflation gap at time T0 is positive. However, the model is valid even if this 
assumption does not hold. As wages enter an adjustment phase, inflationary pressures fade 
away and inflation rate declines. Inflation gap turns negative and reaches a minimum at time 
T3, the same as the cumulated real wage gap. In the next stage, as wages resume growth, 
inflation rate starts rising, but it remains subdued, below the central bank’s inflation target, 
until time T5, when the cumulated real wage gap is closed. Afterwards, wages continue to 
increase, and the wage gap widens in the positive territory. Consequently, inflationary 
pressures strengthen, pushing up the inflation rate above the central bank’s inflation target at 
time T6. 
Central bank’s 
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3.3 Post-crisis Phillips curve: Cumulated real wage gap vs. inflation gap 
The relationship between cumulated real wage gap and inflation gap is presented in Chart 3. 
The equation of the post-crisis Phillips curve is written as follows: 
[𝛱𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇𝑛]𝑁 = 𝑓([𝑐𝑊𝑔𝑎𝑝 𝑇𝑛]𝑁) + [𝜀𝑇𝑛]𝑁 (18) 
By introducing the equations for inflation gap and cumulated real wage gap into relation (18), 
the Post-Crisis Phillips curve becomes: 
[𝛱𝑇𝑛 − 𝛱𝑇𝑛
∗ ]𝑁 = 𝑓([∑ (𝑊𝑇𝑛 − 𝑊𝑇0)]𝑁)
𝑁
𝑛=1 + [𝜀𝑇𝑛]𝑁 (19) 
where N is the period of time for which the Phillips curve is evaluated and 𝜀𝑇𝑛  is the residual, 
which accounts for other variables influencing the inflation gap. 
Chart 3. Post-crisis Phillips curve: Cumulated real wage gap vs. inflation gap 
 
Source: Author. 
The shape of the post-crisis Philips curve expresses the theoretical assumption that after the 
cumulated wage gap has been closed, the impact of higher wages on inflation is stronger than 
before, when the cumulated wage gap was negative.  
Inflation gap 
Cumulated real wage gap 
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The dotted lines indicate possible variations depending on other variables, both exogenous and 
endogenous, which influence the inflation rate.  
4. Empirical evidence 
The idea about cumulated wage gap and its role on inflation popped up when inflation numbers 
for Romania began to look odd: after years of undershooting the inflation target, including 
negative inflation rates, the inflation reshuffled in October 2017, following a series of supply-
side shocks, but it continued to grow by the end of that year and reached 5% in the first quarter 
of 2018. In the previous years, wage growth was higher than in the recent months, but it 
seemed to have little if any impact on inflation, even when tax-neutral inflation rate was 
considered.  
However, as Chart 4 compellingly shows, having the last quarter of 2008 as the maximum 
reference point for real wage, inflation re-emerged only after the cumulative real wage gap 
was closed. It is worth mentioning that Romania had a recession in 2009-2010 and it witnessed 
a nominal wage cut in the public sector in 2010. Until 2014, wages were gradually restored and 
a policy of increasing the minimum wage was gradually implemented. Nevertheless, it was not 
until 2017 that the cumulated real wage gap closed. 
 
Chart 4. Cumulated real wage gap and inflation, Romania, 2008-2018 
 
 
 Note: Quarterly data; net average wage; inflation rate is adjusted with the impact of VAT rate changes. 
Source: National Institute of Statistics, National Bank of Romania, own calculations. 
 
Starting from this empirical observation, we built the Philips curve for the (cumulated real wage 
gap vs. inflation gap) for countries that experienced economic downturn and subsequent real 
wage adjustments (see Charts 5-8 below). We tested all OECD countries. We report a selective 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2
0
08
Q
4
2
0
09
Q
1
2
0
09
Q
2
2
0
09
Q
3
2
0
09
Q
4
2
0
10
Q
1
2
0
10
Q
2
2
0
10
Q
3
2
0
10
Q
4
2
0
11
Q
1
2
0
11
Q
2
2
0
11
Q
3
2
0
11
Q
4
2
0
12
Q
1
2
0
12
Q
2
2
0
12
Q
3
2
0
12
Q
4
2
0
13
Q
1
2
0
13
Q
2
2
0
13
Q
3
2
0
13
Q
4
2
0
14
Q
1
2
0
14
Q
2
2
0
14
Q
3
2
0
14
Q
4
2
0
15
Q
1
2
0
15
Q
2
2
0
15
Q
3
2
0
15
Q
4
2
0
16
Q
1
2
0
16
Q
2
2
0
16
Q
3
2
0
16
Q
4
2
0
17
Q
1
2
0
17
Q
2
2
0
17
Q
3
2
0
17
Q
4
2
0
18
Q
1
Cumulated wage gap Inflation rate (deviation from central bank's target) (rhs)
percent percent
10  LIVIU VOINEA 
 
list of results, for simplicity reasons. The starting year for each country corresponds to the year 
of the maximum reference wage value in the past, prior to the crisis.  
Chart 5. Post-crisis Phillips curve for the United States  
US (1992-2016) US (2001-2016) 
  
US (2010-2016)  
 
 
 
Note: Annual data; average wage; the starting year is the peak reference wage value in the past. 
Source: OECD, author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
 
R² = 0.2677
-400
-350
-300
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
-3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Inflation gap (%)
C
u
m
u
la
te
d
re
al
 w
ag
e 
ga
p
 (
%
)
R² = 0.2912
-180
-160
-140
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
-3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Inflation gap (%)
C
u
m
u
la
te
d
re
al
 w
ag
e 
ga
p
 (
%
)
R² = 0.4621
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
-2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inflation gap (%)
C
u
m
u
la
te
d
re
al
 w
ag
e 
ga
p
 (
%
)
EXPLAINING THE POST-CRISIS PHILIPS CURVE: CUMULATED WAGE GAP MATTERS FOR INFLATION | 11 
 
Chart 6. Post-crisis Phillips curve for selected countries, South European euro-area countries 
Greece (2002-2016) Greece (2009-2016) 
  
 
Italy (2001-2016) 
 
Italy (2010-2017) 
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Portugal (2010-2016) 
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Spain (2001-2016)  
 
Spain (2010-2016) 
  
Note: Annual data; average wage; the starting year is the peak reference wage value in the past.  
Source: OECD, author’s calculations. 
 
Chart 7. Post-crisis Phillips curve for core euro-area countries 
Germany (2001-2016) France (2001-2016) 
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Chart 8. Post-crisis Phillips curve for other         
OECD countries 
 
Ireland (2001-2016) 
 
 
 
Switzerland (2001-2016) 
  
 
Canada (2002-2016) 
 
Korea (1998-2016) 
  
 
Mexico (2001-2016)  
 
New Zealand (2001-2016) 
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UK (2010-2016) Belgium (2010-2016) 
  
 
Israel (2009-2016) 
 
Sweden (2001-2016) 
  
Note: Annual data; average wage; the starting year is the peak reference wage value in the past.  
Source: OECD, author’s calculations. 
 
The theoretical model is confirmed: depending on the recession episode which we take as 
reference, the cumulated wage gap explains a significant part of the deviation of inflation from 
its target. 
For wage adjustment episodes 15 years ago or more, the cumulated wage gap explains: 
- between one-fifth and one-third of inflation gap for the US, Germany, Canada, Korea and 
Sweden;  
- almost one-half of the inflation gap for France, Portugal, Spain and Mexico; 
- around 60% of the inflation gap for Italy, Ireland and Switzerland; and 
- more than 70% of the inflation gap for Greece, New Zealand. 
For the most recent wage adjustment episode, the cumulated wage gap (which in most cases 
has not been closed yet) explains: 
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- almost half of the inflation gap in the US; 
- almost half of the inflation gap in Italy, Spain and Belgium; 
- two-thirds of the inflation gap in Portugal; and  
- more than 80% of the inflation gap in Greece, Israel and UK. 
Therefore, we were able to test and validate that cumulated wage gap matters for inflation. 
This holds true for US, UK, core and periphery euro-area countries and other OECD countries – 
at a level which varies, depending on the reference time and country-specific factors, but which 
is nonetheless significant in all cases. The subdued inflation is determined by the cumulated 
wage gap being still negative. 
The predicted shape of the curve has also been confirmed.  
5. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
In this paper we introduce the concept of cumulated wage gap, meaning the cumulated gap 
between the current wage and a maximum reference wage value in the past. The permanent 
income hypothesis is fundamentally flawed in times of crisis, because of uncertainty of future 
income. The only certain reference value lies in the past, not in the future: and that is why the 
current consumption is influenced by the past income. A recession is a game-changer. In a crisis, 
the reference is not ahead of us, but it is rather in the past. Retirement savings and linear 
employment prospects are uncertain. People relate to their peak gains in the not so distant 
past rather than to their uncertain future gains.  
We allow for the Philips curve to be non-stationary: it moves over time, and it is normal to do 
so. Reference wage values, social preferences, jobs’ characteristics, skill endowments and even 
Central Banks’ targets, they all change over time – hence, the impact of wage gaps on inflation 
cannot be the same in different time periods.  
The finding of our model is that inflation depends on the cumulated wage gap: it does not 
increase close to or above its target level until the cumulated real wage gap is closed. We were 
able to empirically test and confirm our hypothesis for all OECD countries, including US, UK, 
core and periphery euro area.  
For Philips curve to work, the loss of welfare from a negative cumulated real wage gap must be 
fully compensated first – as a stock measure, not as a flow. The policy implication from our 
finding is that countries which closed their cumulated real wage gap should be much more 
prudent in further wage increases – because they will be seen in inflation much faster and larger 
than in the recent past. For countries which have not closed their cumulated real wage gap the 
implication is that inflation will remain subdued until they close their cumulated wage gap.  
Further work needs to be done to extend the model to a fully-fledged stock model, by 
introducing the cumulated inflation gap. This would be relevant for a proper calibration of 
inflation targeting, should the cumulated inflation gap be consistently negative or positive. 
However, the model we propose in this paper is very relevant for policy makers, as it helps 
16  LIVIU VOINEA 
 
explain why inflation has been subdued since the last crisis. Our finding is that inflation has 
been subdued because the cumulated wage gap has not been closed yet. When this happens, 
inflation will re-emerge fast.   
References 
Alichi, A. (2015), “A New Methodology for Estimating the Output Gap in the United States”, IMF Working 
Paper, WP/15/144, IMF, Washington, D.C. 
Borio, C. (2017), “How much do we really know about inflation?”, presentation at the 87th Annual 
General Meeting of the BIS, 25 June. 
Carney, M. (2017), “[De]Globalisation and inflation”, speech given by the Governor of the Bank of 
England at the IMF Michel Camdessus Central Banking Lecture, 18 September. 
Cunliffe, J. (2017), “The Phillips curve: lower, flatter or in hiding?”, Deputy Governor of the Bank of 
England, speech given at the Oxford Economics Society, 14 November. 
Duesenberry, J. (1952), “Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior”, Harvard Economic 
Study Number Eighty-Seven, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Friedman, M. (1957), A Theory of the Consumption Function, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Gali, J. (2011), “The return of the wage Phillips curve”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 
June, 9(3): 436–461. 
Keynes, J. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, New York, NY: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
International Monetary Fund (2018), “Regional Economic Outlook: Europe. Managing the Upswing in 
Uncertain Times”, May. 
International Monetary Fund (2017), World Economic Outlook, October. 
Modigliani, F. (1966), “The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving, the Demand for Wealth and the Supply of 
Capital”, Social Research, 33 (2): 160–217. 
Phillips, A.W. (1958), “The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage 
Rates in the United Kingdom 1861–1957”, Economica, 25: 283-299. 
Praet, P. (2016), “The European Central Bank’s fight against low inflation – reasons and consequences”, 
speech by Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank at LUISS School of 
European Political Economy, Rome, 4 April. 
Praet, P. (2018), “Economic developments in the euro area”, remarks by Member of the Executive Board 
of the European Central Bank at the Cercle de Lorraine, Brussels, 1 February. 
Spencer, G. (2017), “Low inflation and its implications for monetary policy”, speech by the Governor of 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand delivered to the Institute of Directors in Auckland, 5 December.  
 CEPS ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
ABOUT CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, CEPS is widely recognised as the most experienced and 
authoritative think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS acts as a leading forum 
for debate on EU affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research capacity and 
complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
 Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today 
 Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
 Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process 
 Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations 
Assets 
 Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable 
analysts 
 Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research 
expertise and to extend its outreach 
 An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding 
board for the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Finance 
Regulation 
Rights 
Europe in the World 
Energy and Climate Change 
Institutions 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Energy Climate House (ECH) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
